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ABSTRACT
Enterprise systems need reliable, flexible and secure means for making public and confidential
information available to users in a secured and trusted manner. Although enterprise systems
have variety of choice to authenticate these users, organizations face significant issues when
granting access and providing a manageable structure for valuable access control. Logon
functionalities such as user name and password algorithm have been used to grant
authentication and authorization into enterprise systems network resources. Since most systems
clients prefer the ease of using passwords, and since passwords are easily compromised, the
urgency for a stronger authentication process becomes paramount. This study performed an
internal evaluation of enterprise systems such as rating the effectiveness of a security platform as
well as an external evaluation; i.e., analyzing how a security system is been rated by external
entities. The study will examine correlations between system security best practices and reported
or observed outcomes. The study concluded by evaluating the use of added protective layers to
the two or multi-factor authentication security system.
INTRODUCTION
Enhancement in information access has necessitated new challenges to users for the fortification
of susceptible data and systems resources against emergent number of security risks and theft
related issues. Enterprise systems have witnessed breaches and malicious intrusions into
network systems. This has raised the standard for security compliance by system engineers as
they struggle to protect network vulnerabilities and meet regulatory compliance. With the rising
number of data security breaches and the increasing sophistication of cybercrime, protecting
access to organization critical data and systems becomes a major necessity.
System gurus comprehend the potential threats posed to their networks and are devising means to
cope with those threats and implement sustainable solutions. As businesses strive for
transparency, interoperability and mobility, respective corporate networks become susceptible to
threats from a third party whose security apparatus is not subject to audits and control
mechanism by the system (Altman, 2006). Systems employees are given administrative
privileges to enable such individuals perform their administrative duties. Such rights could be
compromised by disgruntled employees, contractors, vendors, or temporary workers, thereby
allowing critical security services to be inoperable.
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Several enterprise systems use Internet filtering tools such as intrusion detection software and
firewalls to protect valuable data on their systems, but additional security measures are needed to
safeguard the loss of intellectual properties and other valuable data on a system. Most of these
companies do not have enforcement apparatus to enforce compliance or to report on suspicious
activities (Resencrance, 2004). Phishers are constantly circumventing the two-multi factor
authentication scheme by implementing man-in-the middle attacks. Due to this loophole in the
enterprise policy security infrastructure, corrective measures to detect and prevent threats from
malware, hackers, malicious users, become paramount.
According to Andress (2006), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported that identity theft
affected nearly 90 million Americans and cost approximately $173 billion in 2005. Also,
Skoudis (2005) found evidence that worldwide identity theft and related crimes could cost
businesses about $532 billion in losses by the end of 2010.
Since most end-users and various enterprise clients perform a fraction of their business
transactions at their respective local offices, the need for a reliable and secured authentication
mechanism cannot be overstated. End-users, who engage extensively on electronic services,
complain that passwords have become difficult to remember (Andress, 2006). Most of the
systems require password changes every 90 days and this makes it cumbersome to remember
which password was used within a given period.
Logon functionalities of user name and password algorithm have been used to grant
authentication and authorization into enterprise systems network resources. Although
authentication provides system administrators with valuable information about who is accessing
the application, users get frustrated remembering user name and logon IDs. Since passwords can
be compromised, the urgency for a stronger authentication process becomes paramount.
Solutions to these problems could include the fortification of the Enterprise Network Security
platform and the addition of more security layers for a stronger multifactor authentication
process. A strong authentication process should include, but not limited to, a device or
information that the user possesses. These could include a hardware token or a barometric
characteristic or some information or code that the user knows. An example would be a Personal
Identification Number (PIN). Other examples might include smart cards or badges.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Ofir (2005), Lu, Liu, Yu, and Yao (2005), Ryker and Bhutta (2005), Opara (2004), Pescatore,
Nicolett, and Orans (2004), and Krim (2003) among others have noted that in the past few years,
systems security administrators have seen a decline in recreational hacking, and an increase in
commercial hacking. Skoudis (2005) reiterated by stressing the importance of data protection in
this digital environment.
Potential proliferation and the persistency of professional hackers have lead to the desire of
enterprise security administrators to protect crucial systems from unauthorized access (Vijayan,
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2006). If data and information are not protected, enterprise systems could lose the confidence of
customers as well as shareholders.
Vijayan (2006) stressed that by end of calendar year 2009, the annual amount of money spent on
security software support services in the United States could surpass $920 million dollars.
Skoudis (2005) argued that by year-end 2008, 95 percent of enterprise systems will have
implemented network access control policies and procedures to guide the network system.
Vijayan (2006) and Jain (2005) in a recent study, identified some key market drivers as the
reason for a stronger security platform and authentication. These are increasing open networks
capabilities, the extended mobile users that connect to enterprise networks, the continuous
weakness of passwords as a security mechanism, the increased number of online users, the
increased emphasis on policy and regulatory compliance issues across the industries.
Ofir (2005), Scholtz (2004), Opara and Rob (2003), among others argued that speaker
verification and speech recognition technologies provide viable secure caller authentication
techniques with no constraint for physical tokens.
When considering a good solution for office to office connectivity, especially when a small
number of trusted users access the LAN from managed corporate PCs, the network layer IPSec
VPNs will be an ideal connectivity component (Altman, 2006).
Ewing (2006), Jepson (2006), Gage (2007), Price (2007) among others, conclude that the
authentication market for enterprise systems would continue to grow at an exponential rate
during the next few years as businesses seek to protect access to enterprise network resources.
METHODOLOGY
Determining the buoyancy level and adequacy of a stronger authentication methodology as a
barrier to network systems intrusions, a survey was conducted to access users’ perception and
understanding of the importance of a strong authentication system. User profiling in terms of
setup time will also used. The survey instrument was distributed randomly to Business
Intelligence (BI) professional at the 2008 International Microwave IT symposium in Atlanta
Georgia. Some of the target participants included professionals from Informatica, SAP Business
Objects, Netezza, MicroStrategy Inc., IBM, Dataupia, Baseline Consulting, and DataFlux. Of
the 644 surveys originally distributed, 201 were fully completed and 17 were rejected for lack of
completion. The two hundred and one fully completed surveys represent a response rate of 32.2
percent (201/(644-17)). The responses were assigned weights that were summed to indicate the
trends for more fortified security authentication technology. The authors noted that beyond an
appeal to help the researchers, respondents were not offered any other incentives to complete the
surveys.

© International Information Management Association, Inc, 2010

23

ISSN: 1543-5962-Printed Copy

ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy

Journal of International Technology and Information Management

Volume 19, Number 4 2010

RESULTS FROM DATA ANALYSIS DIALOG
The authors identified two of the variables from the survey as “outcome” variables. The
designated outcome variables were #5 (How strongly do you agree to the effectiveness of the
security systems of your organization?) and #9 (How do your customers, vendors, partners,
suppliers, clients, and others agencies rate your security systems?).
One variable, #6 (Have there been security system breaches in your organization?) was viewed
as a possible outcome variable as well as a contributing variable. All other variables dealt with
technical aspects of security and were viewed as contributing to the outcome variables.
The authors realized that some transformations of the data would be required before meaningful
statistical analysis could be performed. Most of the contributing variables had a few responses
of “don’t know” or “not sure”. These variables were transformed into binary variables where 1 =
“yes” and 0 = “not yes” (“no” or “not sure” or “don’t know”). This transformation allowed the
use of these contributing variables as binary “dummy variables” in linear regression analyses.
Before the authors tried to analyze the outcome variables in terms of their relationships to
contributing variables, the authors tried to use factor analysis to reduce the number of
contributing variables. High correlations between contributing variables indicated that such a
reduction might be possible. The results of the factor analysis procedure did not yield
significant, useful reductions. Four composite factors emerged which could explain 71% of the
variation in the set of six contributing variables. The 29% of remaining unexplained variation
was deemed too large to justify reduction from six to four variables.
The authors tried to use the contributing variables to predict the values of variable #6 (Have there
been security system breaches in your organization?). Using stepwise linear regression, the
authors found that no contributing variable met the entry criterion of p = .05. This was not
particularly surprising when you consider that variable #6 was not a true measure, but only an
estimate made by respondents. There may have been many system breaches that respondents did
not know about.
The authors were successful in using stepwise linear regression to find a predictive relationship
between internal confidence in the system (outcome variable, #5) and two contributing variables.
The two significant contributing variables were variable #6 (Breaches in the system), and
variable #8 (frequency of password changes).
The overall percentage of all respondents who had confidence in their own security system was
53.7%. Table (1) below shows that the first variable to enter into the predictive model for
internal confidence is variable 6 (Breaches in the system). Variable #6 entered the model with a
negative coefficient. This means the more that users observed or recognized breaches in the
security system, the lower the predicted confidence in the system. With this variable in the
predictive model, the constant is 67.5%, 13.8 percentage points higher than the base case (with
no predictive variables). That means that for respondents who reported no breaches, the
predicted percentage indicating confidence was 67.5%. For respondents who reported no
breaches, the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence was 64.0%.
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The coefficient for variable #6 in the predictive model was -.259. This factor is used within the
predictive model for respondents who reported breaches. For those who reported breaches, the
predicted percentage indicating confidence in the system would be 67.5% – 25.9% = 41.6%.
For respondents who reported breaches, the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence in the
system was 42.0%.
Table 1: Predictive Models for Internal Confidencea.
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
.675
.058
-.259
.052
-.333

Model
1
(Constant)
V#6
reaches
2
(Constant)
.564
V#6 breaches
-.212
V#8 pw_freq
.124
a. Dependent Variable: Internal

.100
.054
.048

-.273
.180

T
13.304
-4.980

Sig.
.000
.000

5.639
-3.906
2.581

.000
.000
.011

After variable #6 was included into the predictive model, variable #8 (How often are you
required to change your password?) entered the predictive model. Unlike variable #6, which had
a negative coefficient in the predictive model, variable #8 had a positive coefficient. This means
the more often users are required to change their passwords, the higher the predicted confidence
in the system.
With variable #6 and variable #8 in the predictive model, the constant is 56.4%, 2.7 percentage
points higher than the base case (with no predictive variables). That means that for respondents
who reported no breaches, and very low frequency for required password changes, the predicted
percentage indicating Internal Confidence was 56.4%. For respondents who reported no
breaches and very low frequency for required password changes, the ACTUAL percentage
indicating confidence was 60.0%.
The coefficient for variable #6 in the predictive model was .124. This factor is used within the
predictive model for respondents who reported a high frequency for required password changes.
For those who reported no breaches and a high frequency for required password changes, the
predicted percentage indicating confidence in the system would be 56.4% + 12.4% = 68.8%.
For respondents who reported no breaches and a high frequency for required password changes,
the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence in the system was 64.4%.
For those who reported breaches and a high frequency for required password changes, the
predicted percentage indicating confidence in the system would be 56.4% - 21.2% + 12.4% = 47.6%.
For such respondents, the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence in the system was 44.4%. These
results are summarized in Table 2 below.
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Table 2: Predicted and Reported Percentages of Internal Confidence.
Reported
Breaches

Reported Frequent
Password Change

Predicted Internal
Confidence(%)

Reported Internal
Confidence(%)

No
Yes
No
Yes

No
No
Yes
Yes

67.5%
41.6%
68.8%
47.6%

64.0%
42.0%
64.4%
44.4%

After analyzing internal confidence in the security system, the authors were successful in finding
a predictive relationship between External Confidence in the system ( How do your customers,
vendors, partners, suppliers, clients, & others agencies rate your security systems) and the same
two contributing variables (#6 & #8) which were significant predictors of Internal confidence.
The percentage of all respondents who reported External Confidence (outcome variable, #9) was
47.3%. Table (3) below shows that the first variable to enter into the predictive model is variable
6 (Breaches in the system). Variable #6 entered the model with a negative coefficient. This
means that the more users observed or recognized breaches in the security system, the lower the
predicted confidence in the system. With this variable in the predictive model, the constant is
87.8%, 40.5 percentage points higher than the base case (with no predictive variables). For
respondents who reported no breaches, the predicted percentage indicating confidence was
87.8%. For such respondents, the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence was 92.0%.
Table 3: Predictive Models for External Confidencea.
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
1
(Constant)
.878
.051
V#6 breaches
-.440
.045
-.566
2
(Constant)
1.081
.087
V#6 breaches
-.485
.047
-.623
V#8 pw_freq
.119
.042
.173
a. Dependent Variable: External

t
17.208
-9.685
12.387
-10.240
2.841

Sig.
.000
.000
.000
.000
.005

The coefficient for variable #6 in the predictive model was -.440. This factor is used within the
predictive model for respondents who reported breaches. For those who reported breaches, the
predicted percentage indicating confidence in the system would be 87.8% – 44.0% = 43.8%.
For such respondents, the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence in the system was 40.2%.
After variable #6 was included into the predictive model, variable #8 (How often are you
required to change your password?) entered the predictive model. Unlike variable #6, which had
a negative coefficient in the predictive model, variable #8 had a positive coefficient. This means the more
often users are required to change their passwords, the higher the predicted confidence in the system.
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With variable #6 and variable #8 in the predictive model, the constant is 108.1%, 20.3
percentage points higher than the base case. For respondents who reported no breaches, and very
low frequency for required password changes, the predicted percentage indicating confidence
was more than 100%. For such respondents (reported no breaches and very low frequency for
required password changes), the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence was 94.1%.
The coefficient for variable #6 in the predictive model was .119. For those who reported
breaches and a high frequency for required password changes, the predicted percentage
indicating confidence in the system would be 108.1% - 48.5% + 11.9% = 72.5%.
For such
respondents, the ACTUAL percentage reporting confidence in the system was 66.7%. This data
is summarized in Table 4, below.
Table 4: Predicted and Reported Percentages of External Confidence.
Reported
Breaches
No
Yes
Yes

Reported Frequent
Password Change
No
No
Yes

Predicted External
Confidence(%)
87.8%
43.8%
72.5%

Reported External
Confidence(%)
92.0%
42.0%
66.7%

As a final step in the analysis of data, the authors decided to add the variable #5, Internal
confidence, to the set of contributing variables in the model to predict variable #8, External
Confidence, and to add External Confidence to the set of contributing variables in the model to
predict Internal Confidence. Adding variable #5 (Internal Confidence) to the set of contributing
variables did not change the model for predicting variable #8, External Confidence. This makes
sense since people outside of an organization will not usually be influenced by (or even know)
the opinions of insiders about system security.
As a contributing variable, however, variable #8 (External Confidence) was significant
for predicting variable #5, Internal confidence. This can be seen in the third step of the stepwise
regression analysis shown below.
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Table 5: Predictive models for internal confidencea.
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
1
(Constant)
.675
.058
Breaches
-.259
.052
-.333
2
(Constant)
.564
.100
Breaches
-.212
.054
-.273
pw_freq
.124
.048
.180
3
(Constant)
.402
.132
Breaches
-.139
.067
-.179
pw_freq
.141
.049
.206
External
.150
.078
.150
a. Dependent Variable: internal

T
13.304
-4.980
5.639
-3.906
2.581
3.032
-2.085
2.913
1.985

Sig.
.000
.000
.000
.000
.011
.003
.038
.004
.046

This chart shows that a high level of confidence in system security by people outside of an
organization can increase the predicted confidence of people inside the organization. The last
line of the table shows that this increase can be as large as 15 percentage points.
ENTERPRISE SECURID – STANDARD FOR STRONG TWO OR MULTI FACTOR
AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS
Since a single factor approach such as a password alone provides a low proof of authentication,
the addition of a subsequent substantial proof assures that the authenticity will be elevated.
Wells Fargo Bank and Bank of America among other banks are examples of a widely used form
of two/multi factor authentication technology. A multifactor authentication uses two or three
different ways to authenticate users’ profile. These include the use of a password or a knowledge
based authentication such as response to a challenge question.
Another way is a physical apparatus, such as a smart card with a chip embedded into the cell, or
hardware token that generates a one time passwords. A third component for identifying a user
might be biometric technology. A fingerprint or an iris scan serves this purpose. Collectively, a
multifactor approach uses a password and a second or third factor as stipulated in the figures
below to authenticate the user in Figures 1, 2 and 3 (Gage, 2006).
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Figure 1: How the System works.

Enterprise Network User on-line (Network Connected)
Enterprise Systems
Domain Controller

[B] Username and passcode provided
to NetworkServer along with date/time
of last available passcode
[C] and [D]. Agent is told
Authentication was successful and is
provided:
- Windows password
- Ticket for hashed passcode retrieval

[E] Username, Windows
password supplied to AD
[F] Emmans Ticket
supplied to desktop

[G] Network/Server provides to
passcode store:
- Hashed passcodes
- Emergency access password
- Encrypted Windows password (for
use when offline)

[A] Username and passcode

23487

Enterprise
Network/Server

Enterprise
hashed
Passcode
store

Source: Gage, 2006.
Figure 2: User off-line (Network disconnected).

Systems
cached
credentials

Desktop

5. Username, Windows password
6. Offline
Emmanues
ticket
2. Username and Passcode
(or emergency access code)

1. Username and passcode,
or emergency access code

3 and 4. Authentication successful
- Decrypted Windows password

Enterprise
hashed
Passcode
store

234878

Enterprise Network/Server

Source: Gage, 2006.
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Figure 3: Solutions at a banking ATM.
Solving the Password Problem
 Combine something you have ...
 User ATM card, for example

+ PIN

•

... with something user knows...
— user PIN

Source: Ewing, 2006.
Authentication choices fall into three categories, see Figure 4. The single factor which is the
password and policy alone is very weak. The two-factor approach, which includes a combination
of two pins, is not bullet proof. The multi-factor approach combines the two factor authentication
and an additional factor such as a biometrics (Grey et al., 2005).
Figure 4: Authentication Choices.

[Low] Authentication Strength
PASSWORD

+

Password
POLICY
Policy

PIN

PIN

+

+

2437

Single factor

PIN

+

+

Two factor

Weaker Authentication

[High]

Multi factor

StrongerAutentication

Source: Grey et al., 2005.

© International Information Management Association, Inc, 2010

30

ISSN: 1543-5962-Printed Copy

ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy

Enterprise Systems Network: SecurID Solutions, Authentication to GSS

E. U. Opara & V. Etnyre

Table 6: Authentication solutions.
Security Levels
Authorization – RACF ETC Level
This level identifies if the user is allowed to do what they’re trying to accomplish on the system
Authentication Level
This is level where multifactor or secured two-factors determine if the user is actually who he or
she says they are.
Privacy Level
This level uses the security technology of Secured Socket Layer [SSL] to protect un-authorized
user from accessing user’s data
Non Repudiation Level
This level prevents the user from claiming that they did not authorize the transaction etc.
Source: Ofir, 2005.
As Table 6 indicates, an example of an authorization gadget is a password. This device makes it
possible for the system to approve the requestor access into the system, as the true holder of the
password. However, for additional level of security, it becomes paramount for the system to
authenticate the user (Ofir, 2005). This process supposedly will guarantee that the user or the
holder of the password is actually who they claim they are as they attempt to logon to the
network. There are now breakthroughs in latest security apparatus that can be used in
combination with passwords to identify authorized users, see Figure 5.
Figure 5: Complete analysis of an Enterprise Network Security Architecture
Enterprise Network Security Platform/Architecture
Enterprise

Network Security Policy

Network
Security

Enterprise Security Behavioral Analytic

Platform

Enterprise Network Security Central

[ENSP]

Connection
to Network
and Systems
Management

Enterprise
Secure
Network

Switches

Infrastructure
[ENSI]

Routers

IP applications, etc

Source: Prince, 2007.

The enterprise network security architecture is comprised of the ENSP and the ENSI. Together,
both elements are built into an enterprise architectural landscape that is able to capture, analyze
and remediate security problems in real time.
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As shown in the diagram above, enterprise network security platform (ENSP) is the central
command facility that acts on the security information intercepted in the processing chain. The
ENSP functionalities include the control, analytics and policy functions.
In order to enable enterprise centralized network security management and administration
perform properly, the control phase ensures that all dubious information and other surveillance
information collected from the ESNI are aggregated for analysis.
At the Analytics phase, data that have been stored and analyzed for behavioral anomalies are reevaluated. These analyses could be a result of historic events on systems vulnerabilities and
abnormalities on traffic patterns.
At the Policy phase, systems protective policy implementation is configured through the ENSP
policy engine. This mechanism accelerates enforcement procedures based on established
benchmarks. These include but not limited to gateways, access rights, ports, protocols and traffic
anomalies.
The other component of the network security architecture is the Enterprise Network Secured
Infrastructure (ENSI). These components are comprised of several routers, switched, IP
applications, scanners, security and observatory apparatus that are in the processing chain. The
ENSI perform the Enterprise Network Observatory and Enforcement duties.
In the Network Observatory phase, each periphery monitors enterprise network traffic flow for
abnormities as data passes their respective locations.
In the Enforcement phase, imbedded filtering features permit each periphery to perform the
duties of an Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) when prompted by a systems command.
The end result is that the ENSA is able to centralize security automaton enforcement thereby
enhancing operational efficiency and productivity.
IMPLICATIONS TO BUSINESS AND SYSTEMS SECURITY GURUS
Systems security and network professional are constantly faced with new challenges. One of
these challenges is that the networks gurus will continuously scrutinize the network for
unscrupulous, dubious and unauthorized peripheries that could cause a breach in security.
Another challenge that these gurus face is unending scrutiny on suspected problematic areas as
they are detected. Since 911 incidents, systems security is now an on-going venture, and as such,
these experts will be expected to develop breakthroughs to safeguard the enterprise.
CONCLUSION
As this study has shown, without a strong authentication mechanism, no functionality in SSL
would avert a trespasser from getting biometric or keystroke recordings and impersonating an
authorized user. The notion of Network Security Architecture is exclusive because it assumes an
architectural approach. Combinations of this approach with a two-factor or a multi-factor
approach will increase the security infrastructure of a system. Enterprise systems gurus whose
organizational goals are to maximize their return on investment and exceed their customers’
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expectations, should implement vendor-neutral solutions that work with their existing
infrastructure thereby enabling the system to quarantine and destroy threats from malware and
unknown or non-compliant users.
Breakthroughs and innovative ventures are now in place that defines policies, controls and
analytic measures that are now implemented to system-wide platforms. Enterprise system clients
and end-users whose businesses necessitate thorough security measures are implementing
Security SecurID multifactor authentication as the flag bearer for protecting network systems.
The study shows that there is no definite solution at this moment to fully eliminate every threat.
However, system security gurus should continue to upgrade policies, assess threats and
implement control mechanism that will consistently manage and protect network security
apparatus.
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